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Justice Carter’s Role in the
Caryl Chessman Cases:
Due Process Matters
By Susan Rutberg*
Introduction
Caryl Chessman was a legendary figure both in California capital punish-
ment history and in the history of the death penalty in our nation. Sentenced
to death in Los Angeles in 1948 at the age of 27, for crimes involving sexual as-
saults, Chessman waged a twelve-year struggle to save his life and to end cap-
ital punishment in this state. Hardly a poster boy for innocence, Chessman
had spent much of his adult life incarcerated for robberies and car thefts. Yet,
before he was executed, this career criminal managed to alert much of the
world to the issues surrounding capital punishment. While on San Quentin’s
death row, despite prison regulations forbidding inmates from writing for pub-
lication, Chessman wrote and published four books.1 The first of those books,
a memoir entitled Cell 2455, Death Row, sold half a million copies and was
published in 18 languages.2
In the 1950s, while Caryl Chessman’s appeal was pending, California’s prison
system operated from the enlightened point of view that individual offenders
could be successfully rehabilitated through education and psychotherapy. The
state’s scheme of indeterminate sentencing meant that parole boards, rather
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3. John Pomfret, California’s Crisis in Prison Systems A Threat to Public: Longer Sentences
and Less Emphasis on Rehabilitation Create Problems,Washington Post, June 11, 2006, at
p. A03. This philosophy held sway until the mid-1970s, when the legislature formally re-
moved “rehabilitation and treatment” from the prison system’s mandate.
4. Hamm, supra note 1, at 2.
5. William L. O’Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the
1960s at 276–277 (Chicago, Quadrangle Books 1971). To students of this history, the
worldwide protests surrounding the December 2005 execution of Stanley (Tookie)Williams
must have seemed familiar. Mr. Williams, on death row for the murders of four people in
Los Angeles in 1981, sought clemency on the grounds of redemption. Admittedly the co-
founder of the violent Los Angeles street gang, the Crips, Williams renounced violence
and apologized for his role in gang life while on death row. His published writings include
a series of anti-gang children’s books, a memoir intended to warn kids away from crime,
and an autobiography, Blue Rage, Black Redemption. Williams was nominated for the
Nobel Peace Prize a total of six times. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger denied
his bid for clemency on December 12, 2005. Williams was executed by lethal injection the
following day. NPR Legal Affairs, Timeline: Tookie’s Path to Death Row, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5047269 (last viewed on June 22,
2006).
6. Although there is no written decision accompanying the grant of the first stay of ex-
ecution Justice Carter extended to Chessman, the fact that Carter granted Chessman’s first
stay is documented in two books: Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, & Dick Adler, Public Jus-
tice, Private Mercy: A Governor’s Education on Death Row 24 (New York: Weiden-
feld & Nicolson, 1989); and Hamm, supra note 1, at 5.
than judges, determined whether an offender had reformed and was suitable
for release.3 To many among Chessman’s wide readership, his ability to artic-
ulate powerful arguments against state sanctioned killing seemed proof posi-
tive of his rehabilitation. It was the belief that Chessman had become a
productive human being while incarcerated, rather than a belief in his inno-
cence, that convinced many to oppose his execution. When Caryl Chessman
was gassed to death in 1960, protestors gathered outside the gates of San Quentin
and at U.S. embassies around the world.4 The fight to spare Chessman’s life
was described by one historian in 1971 as “the most important attack on cap-
ital punishment in American history.”5
Chessman’s legal claims came before California Supreme Court Justice Jesse
W. Carter five times. On two occasions, Carter dissented from the majority
opinions which denied Chessman’s due process claims regarding the accuracy
of the trial transcript and the fairness of his trial (Chessman I and II). In 1952,
and again in 1954 (Chessman III), Carter granted stays of Chessman’s execu-
tion.6 The last time Chessman’s case came before Justice Carter, in 1955, he
again dissented and excoriated the majority for denying Chessman the right
of access to legal materials and counsel while incarcerated (Chessman IV).
01 oppenheimer final 4/19/10 12:07 PM Page 4
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7. Id. at 3–4.
8. After Judge Fricke’s appointment of a new reporter, the Executive Committee of the
Los Angeles Superior Court Reporters’ Association reviewed the original reporter’s notes
and deemed his court shorthand completely undecipherable. Id. at 4.
9. Id.
Chessman’s Crimes
Over a three-week period in January 1948, a rash of unsolved street crimes—
several robberies and a car theft—occurred in the greater Los Angeles area.
During this same time frame, two sexual assaults were committed against
women who had been parked in “lover’s lanes.” In both of the lover’s lanes
cases, the assailant approached the victims’ cars flashing a red spotlight, or-
dered the women out of their cars at gunpoint and coerced them to perform
oral copulation. In one case, the assailant also attempted rape. On January 23,
1948, 26-year-old parolee, Caryl Chessman, and another man, David Knowles,
led police on a five-mile chase before being taken to the Hollywood police sta-
tion, where they were interrogated on suspicion of committing the robberies
and the sexual assaults. After 72 hours of interrogation, Chessman allegedly ad-
mitted the crimes, saying he alone had committed the sexual assaults. Chess-
man later recanted, claiming that police had beaten him into confessing. Both
women identified him as their assailant.7
Trial and Appellate Issues
Chessman was charged with 18 crimes, including robbery, sexual assaults,
and two counts of kidnapping with bodily harm. The kidnapping charges, vi-
olations of Penal Code Section 209, also known as the “Little Lindbergh Law,”
were capital offenses in 1948. Dubbing Chessman the “Red Light Bandit,” re-
porters (and the prosecutor) portrayed him as a violent “sex fiend.”After a jury
trial in which he declined counsel and represented himself, Chessman was con-
victed of 17 of the felony charges. Two days before the sentence was to be pro-
nounced, the original court reporter, Ernest Perry, died. Chessman moved for
a new trial, arguing that no one other than Perry could accurately transcribe
his notes. Judge Charles W. Fricke denied the motion.8 The judge appointed
a new court reporter, Stanley Fraser, a reputed alcoholic who was related by mar-
riage to J. Miller Leavy, the prosecutor who tried the case.9 The judge also ap-
proved payment to Fraser in the amount of $10,000, approximately three times
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10. Brown & Adler, supra note 6, at 24.
11. Since Chessman was not convicted of taking a life, the death sentence imposed by
Judge Fricke would not withstand constitutional scrutiny today. In 1977, the U.S. Supreme
Court found it unconstitutional to impose a death sentence in a rape case, holding that
capital punishment was disproportionate to the crime committed. Coker v. GA., 433 U.S.
584; 53 L.Ed. 2d 982.
12. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455 (1950) [Chessman I]; People v. Chessman, 38
Cal. 2d 166 (1951) [Chessman II]; Ex Parte Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 296 (1954) [Chessman
III]; Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
13. People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 458 (1950). The full title of the document Chess-
man filed was: “Motion for order of Supreme Court to order Superior Court to augment,
correct and properly certify record, to order a hearing in the Superior Court relative to this
matter, and for the Supreme Court to agree to decide on appeal (or otherwise) certain un-
decided questions of law relative to the preparation of a reporter’s transcript for use on ap-
peal in a capital offense and the applicability of section 953e C.C.P. to criminal cases.”
14. Id. at 468.
the normal fee for a court reporter.10 Judge Fricke sentenced Chessman to
death.11
Later, at a hearing at which Chessman was neither present nor represented
by counsel, the trial judge approved the transcript Fraser produced. The issue
of whether or not this transcript was an accurate record of the proceedings
was disputed in state and federal courts for the next twelve years, until Chess-
man’s execution in 1960.12
Chessman I
In Chessman I (1950), Chessman, acting as his own lawyer, filed a document
in the Supreme Court protesting the manner in which the trial judge had cer-
tified the record. He asked the Supreme Court to order the Superior Court to
hold a hearing on the matter. Chessman also asked the Supreme Court to de-
cide “certain undecided questions of law relative to the preparation of a re-
porter’s transcript for use on appeal in a capital offense . . . .”13 The majority
opinion concluded that the transcript filed by the substitute court reporter,
Fraser, with certain minor augmentations, was a sufficient record on which to
base appellate review. The Court dismissed Chessman’s attempted appeal from
the trial judge’s order certifying Fraser’s transcript, ruling that the trial court’s
orders and determinations on this issue were simply not appealable.14
Justice Carter joined fellow Supreme Court Justice Edmonds in dissenting
from the majority’s conclusions. Edmonds took the position that because the
substitute reporter was not able to certify that the transcript was an accurate
01 oppenheimer final 4/19/10 12:07 PM Page 6
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15. Id. at 474.
record of the proceedings, the record lacked the proof of authenticity required
by law and therefore Chessman was entitled to a new trial. In light of the fact
that this was a death penalty case subject to automatic review by the Supreme
Court, Justice Edmonds believed that judicial review of the evidence, in the
absence of a complete and correct record, violated the Constitution.15 Carter
filed a separate dissent.
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
In the main I agree with the basic concept expressed in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Edmonds, but I would not go so far as to hold that in
every case where the death penalty is imposed, the death or disability of the
court reporter before the completion and certification of the record would
justify the granting of a new trial. Should a case be presented where the re-
porter had transcribed all of his notes with the exception of routine testi-
mony of character witnesses, or other evidence more or less collateral to the
main issue, and no serious objection is made to the accuracy of the portion
transcribed, I would be disposed to hold that there had been a substantial
compliance with the statutes and rules applicable to the preparation of records
in cases of this character. Experience of those who have participated in the
trial of cases dictates that absolute perfection in the preparation of phono-
graphic records is not to be expected. Some errors may exist in records pre-
pared by the most capable and efficient reporters. In fact, any reproduction
of the human voice dependent upon the skill and accuracy of a shorthand re-
porter may contain some errors. That is why a provision is made for the set-
tlement and certification of a record by the trial judge in the event objection
is made to the accuracy of the record certified to by the reporter. But in a
case of this character, where some 1,200 pages of the reporter’s notes had
not been transcribed by him or dictated into a dictaphone, and the tran-
scription of such notes is dependent upon the ability of another reporter to
read the same, I cannot agree that a record prepared in such a manner can
be said to constitute a substantial compliance with the provisions of the
statutes and rules applicable to the preparation of records in cases of this
character.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and grant defendant a new trial
in this case.
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16. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166 (1951).
17. Carter first stayed Chessman’s execution in 1952. On May 13, 1954, Marin County
Superior Court Judge Thomas Keating granted the second stay. Justice Carter again stayed
the execution in July 1954. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark granted a stay in 1955.
Two more judicial stays were granted between 1955 and 1959. U.S. Supreme Court Justice
William Douglas granted another in late 1959. In February 1960, Governor Brown stayed
the execution for 60 days. See Hamm, supra note 1, at 5–7; see also Brown & Adler, supra
note 6, at 24–28, 36–41.
Chessman II
Chessman appealed both his conviction and the order denying his motion
for a new trial, raising several legal issues. Again, Chessman represented him-
self. The central issue in Chessman II remained Chessman’s claim that the tran-
script was inadequate.16 Chessman asserted additional legal errors as well,
including prosecutorial misconduct, and claims that the limitations imposed by
the trial judge on Chessman’s conduct as his own counsel violated his right to
a fair trial. Once again, Justices Carter and Edmonds wrote separate dissents.
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
Because, as was pointed out in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Edmonds
and myself in [Chessman I], there is no adequate record upon which this court
may review the judgments of conviction against the defendant, I would re-
verse said judgments and order denying defendant a new trial on that ground
alone. A reading of the majority opinion, however, convinces me that many
flagrant errors were committed during the trial which would ordinarily be held
to be prejudicial and require the reversal of a judgment of conviction. In fact,
the only way I can rationalize the majority opinion is that those concurring
therein feel that a person charged with 17 felonies of the character of those
charged against the defendant, and who represents himself, is not entitled to
a trial in accordance with the rules applicable to the ordinary criminal case. I
cannot subscribe to this doctrine.
Chessman III
Chessman’s execution was scheduled for March 1952, but in late February
of that year, Justice Carter granted (without a surviving written opinion) the
first of what eventually became eight stays of execution.17 The publication of
01 oppenheimer final 4/19/10 12:07 PM Page 8
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18. See Brown & Adler, supra note 6, at 26–27.
19. In re Caryl Chessman, for Stay of Execution, 43 Cal. 2d 296 (1954).
Cell 2455, Death Row, in early May 1954, drew heightened attention to the
case. One day before the date on which Chessman was next scheduled to die,
a Marin County Superior Court Judge granted a stay in order to permit Chess-
man’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be considered by the state’s high
court. The California Supreme Court denied the writ a month later and Chess-
man’s execution was re-scheduled once again. This time he was scheduled to
die on the same date as two other men, with the triple execution set for July
30, 1954.
On July 29, 1954, one day before Chessman’s scheduled execution date, Ben
Rice, Chessman’s chief lawyer, hiked through the Northern California moun-
tains in search of Justice Carter. Rice found the judge at a campsite in the Sier-
ras, where, writing in longhand and using a tree stump for a desk, Carter
granted another stay.18 Chessman’s application for the stay contained new al-
legations: he had just learned that the trial prosecutor had actual knowledge
of the transcript’s inaccuracy at the time it was approved by the trial court and
presented to the California Supreme Court. The reason Justice Carter granted
this stay was to permit the issue of the transcript’s reliability and the prosecu-
tor’s knowledge thereof to go to the United States Supreme Court.19
STAY OF EXECUTION
An application has been presented to me for a stay of execution pending
the determination of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States to review the denial of an application to the Supreme Court
of California for a writ of habeas corpus on July 21st, 1954. Said application
is based upon the claim that the transcript on appeal from Chessman’s conviction
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County was inaccurate due to the in-
ability to correctly transcribe the notes of the official court reporter who died
before approximately 1,200 pages of his reporter’s notes were transcribed, and
that the inaccuracy of this transcription was known to the prosecuting offi-
cials at the time the transcript was approved by the trial court and presented
to the Supreme Court of California.
It appears from said application that the alleged fraudulent procurement of
said transcript was not known to petitioner until June of this year and the facts
in connection therewith were never presented to any court until the petition
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for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Supreme Court of California on
July 16, 1954.
In my opinion the application presents a serious constitutional question
under the due process clauses of both the Constitutions of the United States
and California, as I can see no distinction between the knowing presentation
by the prosecution of perjured testimony in a criminal case and the knowing
submission of an inaccurate record on appeal in a death penalty case. (cita-
tions omitted).
The statutes of this state make it mandatory that the Supreme Court . . . re-
view the entire record in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and
render a decision based upon such record.
To my mind it is a clear and obvious violation of the due process provisions
of both the federal and state Constitutions for the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia to decide a death penalty case upon an incomplete or inaccurate record
where such record is procured by the fraudulent connivance of prosecuting
officials. This is the legal proposition in Chessman’s petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari and stay of execution, and in my opinion he should have an opportu-
nity to have the Supreme Court of the United States consider his petition for
certiorari which squarely presents this issue.
I have therefore granted Chessman a stay of execution pending the deter-
mination by the Supreme Court of the United States of the merits of his peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari.
Chessman IV
In his earlier Chessman dissents, Justice Carter made two things clear: his
belief that the role of an appellate court was to determine if mistakes had been
made below, and that fundamental fairness was violated when an appellate
court did not have a complete and accurate trial transcript upon which to base
its determination of the legality of the proceedings. Chessman IV concerned
a different aspect of the role of an appellate court: the relationship between
the Court and the California Department of Corrections.
As part of an earlier Superior Court proceeding, Chessman had obtained an
order from the Superior Court, directed to the warden, that he “continue to
be allowed the free exercise of asserted rights in connection with his repre-
sentation of himself.”When the warden removed his law books and typewriter,
allegedly because he helped another man prepare a legal document, Chessman
protested that the warden was in violation of the Court order. On behalf of
theWarden, the Attorney General appealed the validity of the Superior Court’s
01 oppenheimer final 4/19/10 12:07 PM Page 10
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20. Application of Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1 (1955).
order to the Supreme Court. In Application of Chessman, Carter’s colleagues
on the California Supreme Court accepted the Attorney General’s position and
vacated the Superior Court’s order to theWarden which had guaranteed Chess-
man’s access to law books, a typewriter, and consultation with counsel.20 The
Court deemed the Superior Court’s order “unnecessary” and vacated it for that
reason. Carter again dissented, writing an eloquent defense of Chessman’s
right to seek the Court’s protection from the prison administration’s attempts
to limit his rights to legal materials and to the assistance of counsel.
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
... Aside from the question of appealability, I cannot agree with the majority
opinion on the merits. . . . T[he] reversal [of the Superior Court’s order] seems
to be predicated upon the ground that because petitioner was given the facil-
ities to which the order said he was entitled the question has become moot. In
reaching that conclusion the majority ignores the fact that the evidence sup-
ports the order of the superior court in that the conduct of the prison au-
thorities was such that it could at least be inferred that they would continue to
withhold the facilities from petitioner unless a court ordered otherwise. It is
similar to a case in which an injunction is sought, and there is a showing of threat-
ened injury by defendant, but after the injunction is ordered he says he will
be a “good boy.” His belated repentance furnishes no basis for reversing the
judgment granting the injunction. The majority opinion purports to decide
the question anew in spite of its being bound on appeal by the conclusion of
the trial court on conflicting evidence.
The evidence shows that the prison authorities delayed for 14 days in per-
mitting petitioner to have access to the courts; that despite the advice of the at-
torney general petitioner was deprived of such access; that petitioner was
deprived of his personal books and papers and prevented from working on his
case; indeed, this is admitted by the warden and he insisted on his right to do
so; that the warden refused to permit petitioner to consult with an attorney . . .
and the warden testified that if petitioner asked to see that attorney again, “I
am not prepared to say whether or not we would approve it.”All of these things
justified the superior court in concluding that there existed a real danger that
the prison authorities would continue to deny the rights to which petitioner was
entitled. It is of little significance that at the time of the hearing petitioner was
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not being deprived of his rights. . . . Judicial protection of the rights of a pris-
oner would indeed be a mockery if the courts would always accept the pious
protestations of the prison authorities that the rights would be accorded and
then blithely disregard them the next day, leaving the prisoner to commence
his weary journey through the court process toward a chimerical goal. Such con-
ditions are intolerable in a civilized society, yet this court now espouses them....
The rights assured to petitioner by the order of the superior court are im-
portant and any impairment thereof must be carefully scrutinized. It is said
in Ex parte Hull (citation omitted) “[T]he state and its officers may not abridge
or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. . . .” The court said in In re Rider [citation omitted]: “The right of an ac-
cused, confined in jail . . . to have an opportunity to consult freely with his
counsel without any third person . . . being present . . . is one of the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the American criminal law. . . .” There is no basis
whatsoever for the statement in the majority opinion that petitioner is seek-
ing or sought or was granted “special privileges.” The rights sought by peti-
tioner and granted by the trial court are the rights which must be accorded to
all prisoners if the concept of “equal justice under law” is to have any signifi-
cance whatever.
The majority states that prisoners have a right to prompt and timely access
to themails “for the purpose of transmitting to the courts” facts which show ground
for relief but they “have no legally enforceable rights to engage in legal research.”
For that conclusion it cites the code sections to the effect that petitioner is civilly
dead. What bearing that has on a prisoner’s right to defend himself does not ap-
pear. If he may transmit “facts” to the courts in an attempt to obtain relief he
should also be entitled to transmit legal propositions. To do either requires rea-
sonable opportunity to prepare the facts and the law.. . . The order of the trial
court here did not go beyond the bounds of reason. Certainly it cannot be said
its order is so unreasonable that it abused its discretion.
The majority decision is another, in a long line of decisions by this court, in
which this petitioner has been denied his constitutional rights. (citations omitted).
I would affirm the order here under review.
Comment
Running throughout Justice Carter’s jurisprudence on the Chessman case are
twin themes: the importance of procedural due process and the importance of
judicial objectivity. In dissent he spoke as the conscience of the Court, chas-
tising his majority colleagues for what he perceived as their inability to rise
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21. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
22. Id. at 164–65.
23. The Chessman Case, an address given by Justice JesseW. Carter, Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of California to the Bar Association of Alameda County, Oakland, Cal-
ifornia, February 11, 1958, available at http://ggu.edu/lawlibrary/jessecarter/speeches/attac-
hment/021158.pdf, at p. 21.
above politics and defend principles of fundamental fairness for an unpopu-
lar criminal defendant. Justice Carter’s oft-stated position that Chessman had
not received a fair hearing on the issue of the accuracy of the transcript was even-
tually vindicated by the United States Supreme Court in 1957.21 Writing for
the Court, Justice John Harlan held that ex-parte settlement of the state court
record violated Chessman’s constitutional right to procedural due process. Be-
cause Chessman had been neither present nor represented by counsel at the
hearing at which the trial judge approved settlement of this controversial tran-
script, he had not had “his day in court” regarding the accuracy of the record.
The opinion concluded: “California’s affirmance of the convictions upon a se-
riously disputed record, whose accuracy petitioner has had no voice in deter-
mining, cannot be allowed to stand. . . . The proponent before the Court is not
the petitioner, but the Constitution of the United States.”22
After the high court’s decision in Chessman v. Teets, supra, Carter delivered
a speech to the Alameda County Bar Association in which he quoted from Jus-
tice Harlan’s opinion approvingly and reminded his audience that since courts
are administered by human beings, errors are bound to occur. Justice Carter
told the members of the Bar that the creation of higher (appellate) courts to
correct the errors of the lower was an expression of the wisdom of the Con-
stitution’s framers. He ended his remarks this way:
Those of you who believe in a government of law, as I do, must feel,
as I do, that it is a horrifying thought that even a guilty person could
be executed on a conviction obtained in violation of the due process
clauses of the Constitution of the United States. But it is even more
horrifying to realize that if this happen[s] to a guilty person it may
also happen to an innocent person because you cannot protect the in-
nocent without at the same time protecting the guilty. Let one man be
deprived of his property, or his liberty, or his life without due process
of law, and the property, liberty and lives of all of us are in danger. These
are not mere words, they are the armor which shields our liberties
from destruction.23
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24. Jerry Brown served as Governor of California from 1974–1983. He ran for President
in 1992. From 1998 to 2006 Brown served as Mayor of Oakland, CA. In 2008 he was elected
Attorney General of California. http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/mayor/biograp-
hy.html.
25. See Hamm, supra note 1, at 6; see also Brown & Adler, supra note 6, at 39–41.
26. See Brown & Adler, supra note 6, at 41–50.
Although Chessman’s case had been sent back to the trial court by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1957, just two years later, in 1959, after more hearings and
more than 2,000 corrections, the transcript’s legitimacy was affirmed, and the
case was back before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Ultimately, the Court rejected all of Chessman’s claims and his last hope
became a second appeal for clemency from then-Governor Edmund (Pat)
Brown. Personally opposed to the death penalty, but convinced both of Chess-
man’s guilt and his lack of remorse, Governor Brown was prepared to deny
clemency. Rising public sentiment against Chessman’s execution and a phone
call from Governor Brown’s son, Jerry Brown,24 suggested a way out of this
dilemma. On Februrary 19, 1960, Governor Brown put Chessman’s execution
on hold for sixty days and asked the state legislature to declare a moratorium
against the death penalty.25 The moratorium bill never left committee and the
tide of public opinion turned in favor of the death penalty, and heavily against
Brown.26 When the stay ended and a new execution date was set, Brown let it
stand. Caryl Chessman was executed onMay 2, 1960. He outlived Justice Carter
by one year.
In the nearly fifty years since Caryl Chessman’s execution, the debate over
capital punishment and over just how much “due process” criminal defen-
dants are entitled to, has continued to drive much of the political discourse
in our state and the nation. People on both sides of an increasingly polarized
political spectrum argue that the high courts have become overly politicized.
This view is consistent with Justice Carter’s prescient observations in Chess-
man II that the justice administered by his colleagues on the Supreme Court
was blinded by Chessman’s notoriety and the heinous nature of his alleged
crimes.
Writing in dissent from the majority opinion denying Chessman’s claims,
Carter said:
[M]any flagrant errors were committed during the trial which would
ordinarily be held to be prejudicial and require the reversal of a judg-
ment of conviction. . . . [T]he only way I can rationalize the majority
opinion is that those concurring therein feel that a person charged
with 17 felonies of the character of those charged against the defen-
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dant, and who represents himself, is not entitled to a trial in accordance
with the rules applicable to the ordinary criminal case.27
Carter’s reminder to his colleagues that all defendants, regardless of public
opinion, are entitled to due process of law seems even more relevant today,
when many court watchers believe that result-oriented judges are all too fre-
quently the norm. When due process is given short shrift, as Justice Carter
warned, “the armor which shields our liberties from destruction” is in grave dan-
ger.28
Since 1989, 237 wrongly convicted people have been exonerated in the
United States as a result of post-conviction analysis of DNA evidence.29 In Cal-
ifornia, over roughly the same period of time, 200 people have been released
from prison after courts found that they were unjustly convicted.30 These ex-
onerations occurred after the convictions had been affirmed by appellate courts,
in other words, after findings that each defendant had received minimal due
process. These cases, the ongoing concerns about the administration of crim-
inal justice in general, and the death penalty in particular, prompted the State
Legislature to create a Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice in
2004. The Commission’s charge was:
1. To study and review the administration of justice in California to
determine the extent to which that process has failed in the past,
resulting in wrongful executions or the wrongful conviction of
innocent persons.
2. To examine ways of providing safeguards and making improve-
ments in the way the criminal justice system functions.
3. To make any recommendations and proposals designed to fur-
ther ensure that the application and administration of criminal
justice in California is just, fair and accurate.31
The 22-member Commission, chaired by former California Attorney Gen-
eral and former Los Angeles District Attorney John Van De Kamp, included
representatives of law enforcement and victims’ rights organizations, as well as
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, law professors, and members of the
public. The Commission gathered information, conducted public hearings,
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issued reports, and proposed legislation to address issues affecting the integrity
of the California criminal justice system.
The Commission’s study of the death penalty included testimony from 72
witnesses, including Ronald M. George, Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court. In his testimony, the Chief Justice described the state’s death penalty sys-
tem as “dysfunctional.” In June 2008, the Commission issued its final report,
agreeing with the Chief Justice’s assessment and painting a portrait of a system
close to collapse.32
With 680 prisoners awaiting execution, California has the largest death row
population in the nation. The state’s “death row deadlock,” a 17-year average
wait between judgment and execution, is longer than any of the other death
penalty states. The Commission estimates that if changes are not made in the
way the death penalty is administered, a person sentenced to death will wait
25 years for judicial review. Nearly everyone who considers the problem agrees
with the Commission’s conclusion that the death penalty system in California
is terribly broken.33
In fact, George Kennedy, retired District Attorney of Santa Clara County
and a member of the Commission, concluded that “the cumulative evidence
proved to me beyond a reasonable doubt that it is time to replace the death
penalty with permanent imprisonment.” Citing the high costs of the death
penalty system, the long delays, and the prolonged pain caused to victims’
family members, Kennedy told a public forum convened to discuss the Com-
mission’s findings: “it is time to throw in the towel,” and went on to say that
the hundreds of millions California spends on the implementation of the death
penalty could better be spent on other law enforcement needs.34
It is difficult not to speculate that if Justice Jesse W. Carter were alive today
he would support the reforms suggested by the Commission and applaud its
understanding that only an expansive view of due process provides “the armor
which shields our liberties from destruction.”
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